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Increasing inter-bank lending has an ambiguous impact on ﬁnancial stability.
Two opposing eﬀects have been identiﬁed: promoting stability through risk shar-
ing and providing a channel through which contagion may spread. In this paper
we identify the conditions under which each relationship holds. In response to
large economy-wide shocks, greater numbers of inter-bank lending relationships are
shown to worsen systemic events, however, for smaller shocks the opposite eﬀect
is observed. As such there is no optimal inter-bank market structure which maxi-
mizes stability under all conditions. In contrast, deposit insurance costs are always
reduced under greater numbers of inter-bank lending relationships.
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The ﬁnancial regulation of banks has primarily focused on ensuring that individual insti-
tutions have suﬃcient funds to protect themselves from the risk of their own investments.
The events of 2007 and 2008 demonstrated the shortcomings of this approach. Problems
in a small number of banks spread throughout the ﬁnancial system resulting in the collapse
of institutions which, according to regulatory requirements, were adequately protected.
The inter-bank market was supposed to provide insurance and stability by allowing banks
to access liquidity and share risk. Instead, it served as a mechanism by which problems
could spread between institutions. In this paper we examine how the structure of the
inter-bank lending market eﬀects the stability of the ﬁnancial system1. We consider a
model of heterogenous banks within a closed economy. Households deposit money in
banks who invest those funds in risky projects proposed by ﬁrms. The proceeds of these
investments are circulated in the real economy and in future periods paid into banks as
deposits, as such the money multiplies. Banks interact with each other through an inter-
bank market, obtaining funds but exposing themselves and other banks to counter-party
risk and potentially contagion.
It is found that the structure of the inter-bank market has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
ability of the system to resist contagion in response to system-wide macroeconomic shocks.
The optimal structure, however, is dependent on the magnitude of the shock faced. For
small shocks a highly connected inter-bank market provides a risk-sharing eﬀect reducing
the probability of a contagious failure. In contrast, for larger systemic shocks, rather than
reducing risk, inter-bank connections act to propagate the eﬀects of failures: markets with
more inter-bank connections become the most vulnerable. Regardless of the size of shock
the cost to the deposit insurer is minimized for the most connected markets as more of
the cost of failures is borne by surviving banks. The eﬀect of regulatory changes are
investigated. Higher equity and reserve ratio’s are both found to decrease the market’s
susceptibility to contagion by reducing the number of banks who cause a second bank to
1These are not the only inter-bank linkages which can propagate distress. For instance Allen and
Carletti (2006), Markose et al. (2010) and Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) demonstrate alternative mech-
anisms.
2fail. Constraining the size of inter-bank loans, is found to be able to reduce the number of
bankruptcies whilst increasing the quantity of loans given to ﬁrms. Care, however, must
be taken with this regulatory change, if the regulation is set too tight to too loosely it
inhibits the economy or has no eﬀect. Finally if banks condition their conﬁdence of being
repaid on recent bankruptcies the economy becomes less stable and eﬃcient. Whilst if
banks condition their lending on the ﬁnancial position of the borrower stability increases.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section will review related literature.
Section 3 will describe the model. Section 4 will consider the systems susceptibility to
contagion under varying shocks and market structures. Section 5 examines the eﬀect
of regulation whilst Section 6 demonstrates parameter stability and extends the model.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
The inter-bank lending market allows ﬁnancial institutions to lend funds or borrow money
to meet liquidity or investment requirements. In their inﬂuential work, Allen and Gale
(2001) show that in equilibrium banks will optimally insure themselves against liquidity
risk by holding deposits in other banks. This protection, however, makes them potentially
vulnerable to counter-party risk. As such the failure of a signal bank may spread if its
creditors are unable to recover lent funds. This may potentially cause severe contagious
events (Gai and Kapadia, 2010), resulting in a loss of equity (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001)
and may justify government or regulatory intervention (Kahn and Santos, 2010)2.
The majority of trading in the inter-bank-market happens over-the-counter (OTC),
directly between pairs of banks, as opposed to through a central counter-party. Banks
borrow funds and repay them over a length of time which can range from overnight, up
to periods of several years. At any point a particular bank may be involved in multiple
lending or borrowing relationships and as such may be connected to multiple counter-
parties. Across all banks these linkages form a structure which may be described by a
2Also see Giesecke and Weber (2006), Elsinger et al. (2006) and Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) for
alternative views.
3weighted, directed graph in which nodes are ﬁnancial institutions and edges are lending
relationships of a speciﬁc value (e.g. Iori et al. (2008)).
If a single bank fails initially only those banks to which it owes money suﬀer directly,
the remainder of the system is unaﬀected3. The direct impact, however, may cause
one or more of the banks counter-parties to fail which can harm further institutions
within the system. The structure of inter-bank markets, the numbers and distribution of
linkages together with their size, has a large eﬀect on how shocks spread and the markets
potential susceptibility to systemic events (Haldane and May, 2011). Muller (2006) and
Upper and Worms (2004), by analyzing data from the Swiss and German banking systems
respectively, show that in both cases there is signiﬁcant potential for contagion. Highly
centralized markets, those with a few large hub banks like the UK (Becher et al., 2008),
being particularly susceptible to this risk. In contrast Angelini et al. (1996), Boss et al.
(2004) and Furﬁne (2003) ﬁnd that there is relatively little danger of systemic events.
Only a very small number of banks could cause other banks to fail if they themselves
defaulted.
The diﬀerence in conclusions is driven in part by diﬀerences in the inter-bank markets,
e.g. trade volume (Angelini et al., 1996). However, theoretical models present a similarly
ambiguous picture of the eﬀect (e.g. Leitner, 2005). Vivier-Lirimont (2006) ﬁnds that
increasing the number of inter-bank connections worsens contagion. This is partially
supported by Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) who show that increasing cross-holdings
increase the extent of contagion but reduces the eﬀect on individual institutions. In
contrast Giesecke and Weber (2006), in line with Allen and Gale (2001) ﬁnd that more
connections reduce contagion. Using simulation techniques Nier et al. (2007) show that
a small increase in connectivity increases systemic risk but beyond a certain point the
degree of systemic risk decreases. In contrast, Lorenz and Battiston (2008) and Battiston
et al. (2009) ﬁnd the opposite relationship, the scale of bankruptcies is minimized for
intermediate levels of connectivity. Georg (2011) examines diﬀerent types of inter-bank
3For the present we ignore issues regarding market conﬁdence and beliefs. In reality, a bank that is
not directly eﬀected may still fear for their investments and alter their portfolio to limit the possibility
of future losses, e.g. Lagunoﬀ and Schreft (2001).
4networks ﬁnding that those which resemble random graphs suﬀer more from contagion
than those with scale free or small world properties.
The models above give apparently contradictory results regarding the eﬀect of the
inter-bank market. Some show increasing connectivity as providing stabilization, others
as increasing the potential for contagion whilst a few give non-monotone relationships.
The mixed results are due to the interaction of the two eﬀects of inter-bank relationships
discussed by Allen and Gale (2001), risk sharing versus contagious vulnerability. Whilst
sparser networks limit the ability of shocks to spread, reducing contagion, they also reduce
the risk sharing capacity of the market and so increase the risk of individual banks failing.
As Iori et al. (2006) show the inter-bank market may permit crisis to spread, however, it
also provides stabilization meaning the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. The model presented in
the next section will aim to shed light on this ambiguity by identifying the conditions under
which each eﬀect is dominant and so the conditions under which the various conclusions
regarding inter-bank markets hold. Using this model the eﬀect of regulation in limiting
ﬁnancial fragility will be considered.
3 Model
We consider a model of a closed economy containing N banks, M households and Q ﬁrms.
Households, banks and ﬁrms each occupy locations on the circumference of a unit circle.
This circle represents a dimension, not necessarily physical, on which the households,
ﬁrms and banks diﬀer. Banks are equidistantly spaced with bank 1 being located at the
top of the circle and the remaining banks arrayed in index order clockwise around the
circumference. The same arrangement is followed by households and ﬁrms with the agent
with index 1 being at the top of the circle. The distance between a bank and another
economic agent aﬀects the banks ability to attract that agent as a potential borrower or
depositor.
The model operates in discrete time and repeats for an inﬁnite number of time steps.
The actions and investments of each bank in each time step eﬀect their ﬁnancial position
in future periods. The following sub-sections describe the behavior of the banks, ﬁrms
5and households during each period.
3.1 Households
Each household, j, holds depositable funds (dj), the quantity of which is determined
exogenously. Households attempt to maximize the return from these funds by placing





i − g(i,j)) (1)
Where g(i,j) is the distance between i and j4. and r
deposit
i is bank i’s deposit interest
rate. If no i exists such that Equation 1 is positive the household retains its funds and
earns no interest. Banks do not refuse any household deposits. Full deposits insurance is
provided by an agent outside of the system who guarantees that households will be repaid
the full value of their deposits in the event of bank failure. Households are, therefore,
not concerned with the risk of bank default and so select the bank oﬀering the highest
return5.
3.2 Firms
Each time period, each ﬁrm is presented with a single limited liability investment oppor-
tunity, lt
j. Each opportunity requires an initial investment of a single unit of currency at
time t and provides a payoﬀ to the ﬁrm at time t + 2 of µ with probability θlt
j. With
probability 1−θlt
j the investment provides zero payoﬀ. Values of µ are ﬁxed across loans
whilst θlt
j is drawn from a distribution. In order to invest in the opportunity ﬁrms are
required to borrow the full amount from a bank. Each ﬁrm, k, approaches the single bank
which maximizes the ﬁrms expected return:
4In line with the previous hotelling literature(e.g. Salop, 1979) we model transaction costs as linear
in the distance between two actors. Alternative functions were tested and had little qualitative eﬀect on
the results.
5We model households as being highly active in their management of deposits, however, in reality
deposits tend to be sticky. Individuals are slow to respond to changes in interest rates, frequently
maintaining their deposits in institutions paying suboptimal rates, rather than switching. Experiments
were performed in which deposits were sticky - depositors moved with a ﬁxed probability. Probabilities




k(µ − (1 + r
loan
i )
2) − g(i,k) (2)
Where rloan
i is bank i’s per period lending interest rate. If no i exists such that
Equation 2 is positive the opportunity goes unfunded. If bank i funds an investment
opportunity, lt
k, with probability θlt
j the bank receives (1+rloan
i )2 at time t+2 whilst with
probability 1 − θlt
j the bank receives nothing.
3.3 Banks
Each bank, i, has a balance sheet comprising equity (Ei), deposits (Di), cash reserves
(Ri), loans to the non-bank sector (Li) and loans to the other banks (Ii)6. Each time




















i is the repayment probability for loan kt
i (each loan is of unit size) and f(It
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i is bank, i’s estimate of the probability of being repaid in the inter-
bank market. The failure to repay inter-bank lending results in the bankruptcy of the
defaulting bank. In calculating their expected return banks, therefore, assume that they
always repay their own inter-bank borrowings so the probability is 1.
This maximization is subject to the following constraints:
Li + Ri + Ii = Ei + Di (5)













Ri ≥ max(αg,αi)Di (7)
Ei ≥ max(βg,βi)(Li + max(Ii,0)) (8)
Li =  K
t
i  +  K
t−1
i   (9)
The ﬁrst constraint states that each bank’s balance sheet must balance; i.e. assets are
equal to liabilities. The second constraint speciﬁes that the bank’s holding of deposits is
equal to the sum of deposits placed in that bank by households. The bank may neither
refuse deposits nor gain access to additional deposits outside of those contributed by
households. The third constraint governs the level of liquid cash reserves which the bank
holds. It is the maximum of the banks preferred level, αi and a minimum level imposed by
regulation αg. The fourth constrain speciﬁes the maximum equity to risky assets ratio.
Where βi is the bank’s preferred equity ratio and βg is a minimum value imposed by
regulation. The second max operator means only positive values, i.e. inter-bank lending
and not inter-bank borrowing are considered. Note, whilst reserves are assets, they are
not included in the equity ratio as they are risk-less. In this model inter-bank lending and
ﬁrm lending are equally weighted in the risk calculation. The ﬁfth constraint states that
the amount invested in loans is equal to the total funds invested in individual projects.
Here, Kt
i is the set of investments funded by bank i in period t and we deﬁne  .  to be
the sum of the values of loans in the included set. Importantly since loans last for two
periods, this constraint includes all projects funded at time t but also those that were
funded at time t − 1.
We consider this maximization problem to proceed in two stages. First, at the start
of each time period each bank publicly declares its deposit interest rate, r
deposit
i , and
lending interest rate, rloan
i . Households and ﬁrms respond to these rates, placing deposits
and submitting lending request to the appropriate banks. Banks then determine the
allocation of assets and liabilities on their balance sheets to maximize the expected return.
8Money is distributed from household deposits and inter-bank borrowing to fund loans to
ﬁrms, inter-bank lending and to save as cash reserves. The banks equity is the result of its
previous investment decisions up to the current time period. This together with the above
constraints mean that in any given period at the point returns are maximized the level of
Equity, Deposits and Reserve are all known. Additionally the bank still has positions in
loans to ﬁrms and inter-bank lending form the previous time step which it may not change.
The maximization problem it therefore the distribution of the remaining funds between
new inter-bank lending and borrowing and new loans to ﬁrms. In making this decision
bank i determines the composition of Kt
i the set of funded investment opportunities. The
loans are selected from P t
i, the set of investment opportunities presented to bank i by
ﬁrms at time t, i.e. Kt
i ⊆ P t
i. Bank’s invest in zero or more loans in decreasing order of
expected return until the expected return falls below the inter-bank lending rate or the
bank runs out of funds. If the bank runs out of suitable loan opportunities whilst it still
has available funds the bank may lend to other institutions subject to the expected return
of the loan being positive. Alternatively if a bank has excess loan opportunities it may
borrow money from other banks to fund these investments.
3.4 Inter-bank market
Inter-bank lending occurs through an over-the-counter market. The inter-bank rate is
dependent on the lending and borrowing preferences of individual banks which, as shown
in the above maximization, are themselves dependent on the inter-bank rate. There is
no closed form solution for the equilibrium, so in order to identify the interest rate it
is necessary to use an iterative numerical approach. To simplify the initial analysis we
assume a single inter-bank interest rate at which all transactions are conducted7. In
section 6 we relax this assumption.
In over-the-counter markets, transactions are bilateral, when a bank lends money it
lends to one (or more) speciﬁc counter-parties. The pattern of inter-bank lending connec-
7During non-crisis periods, both in reality and this model, the rate at which banks fail is very low
and in a steady state there should be little diﬀerence in the oﬀered inter-bank rates between banks.
Empirically Iori et al. (2008) show that even in an OTC market there is suﬃcient information exchange
for eﬃcient pricing of bilateral transactions
9tions is determined exogenously allowing a range of market structures to be investigated8.
We consider random graphs where the probability that a particular inter-bank lender lends
money to a particular borrower is λ. As λ increases the density of inter-bank connections
increases such that at λ equal to 1 each lender will lend to all borrowers.
The inter-bank connections are constructed as follows. Initially the population of
banks is partitioned into three sets by their desired inter-bank positions: lenders, borrow-
ers and those with no position. Each member of the set of lenders is considered in turn
in decreasing order of the magnitude of funds oﬀered. Let the set of borrowers to which
lender i lends money be Ci. For each borrower, b, in the population with probability λ,
b is added to Ci. If the total amount of funds requested by the members of Ci is less
than the amount i wishes to lend, further banks are added to Ci in decreasing order of
magnitude of requested funds until this is no longer the case. Doing this ensures the
minimum number of banks are added to the set which, is particularly important in gener-
ating minimally connected markets. The lender, i, lends money to each member of Ci in
proportion to their requested funds. By ensuring a minimum level of requested funds by
set Ci we model an eﬃcient ﬁnancial market where lenders and borrowers are able to ﬁnd
each other. The variation of parameter λ therefore eﬀects the degree of diversiﬁcation in
inter-bank lending. If this minimum were not imposed the market would not be eﬃcient
and banks would be constrained in the amount they could lend or borrow by the identities
of their potential partners. Evidence suggests e.g. Iori et al. (2008) that in developed
markets for large ﬁnancial institutions during non-crisis periods the market is eﬃcient
and the chosen representation is appropriate.
In the next section we will show that this method produces networks which match
many features observed in reality. Other mechanisms for determining the allocation of
connections were considered, however, they produced results similar to those generated
with this mechanism for the same number of connections9. Future work will consider
alternative classes of network, e.g. those considered by Cossin and Schellhorn (2007).
8A future development would be to make connection decisions endogenous.
9We also considered λ as an endogenous variable set by each bank. It was found that there was no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the results presented below.
10The two period nature of investments is important in capturing the structure of the
inter-bank market. In any period each bank may be either an inter-bank lender or a bor-
rower, they may not be both. Consequently if investments and the inter-bank borrowing
funding it, lasted only a single period the network would be bipartite. This would limit
the potential for contagion to the failed banks direct creditors. Two period loans allow a
bank to be both a lender and borrower in subsequent periods, allowing failures to spread
and therefore, richer and potentially more realistic contagious events.
3.5 Model Operation
This section details the order of events within each time period. At the start of period
t, interest is paid by banks to households on the deposits established during period t − 1
(Equation 1). After interest is paid, loan success is evaluated for loans established in
period t − 2 and banks repaid by ﬁrms. The inter-bank lending from time t − 2 which
funded these investments is then repaid. If after interest payments and loan success have
been evaluated the bank has negative equity, or if a bank has insuﬃcient cash reserves to
repay its inter-bank debts, it is declared bankrupt. In the event of a bank failure suﬃcient
assets are retained, if available, to cover the value of deposits, any remaining liquid assets
are used to repay creditors in proportion to the size of their debt. If a creditor bank is not
fully repaid it suﬀers a loss in equity which may, potentially cause it to go bankrupt. If
this occurs any inter-bank borrowing on its balance sheet is resolved in the same manner.
As such the failure of one bank may spread to counter-parties and then further within
the system. A bankrupt bank is removed from the ﬁnancial system and takes no further
actions.
If a bank fails to which a ﬁrm or bank owes money, the borrower is still required to
repay its loan at the appropriate due date. This is consistent with an administrator ensur-
ing creditors of a bank meet their requirements. Any funds arising from such repayments
are considered to either be absorbed by the administrators of the failed bank or to go to
the deposit insurer (Equation 4). After loans and bankruptcies have been resolved the










The cash holdings of households available for deposits at the current time step are
equal to the total loans from the previous time step. Money is transferred from ﬁrms
to households as part of the operation of the real economy. When funds are lent to a
ﬁrm to invest, goods or services are purchased and individuals receive wages, resulting in
monetary transfers. In this paper we do not consider the detail and distribution of these
interactions and so we assume that funds are distributed uniformly10.
At this point households place their deposits in banks. Banks then allocate their
funds as described above and the inter-bank rate is calculated along with the lending
and borrowing relationships. Finally at the end of each period an inﬂationary process is








The eﬀect of the inﬂationary process is to maintain a ﬁxed value of equity. Without
this the level of equity within the model could potentially grow to inﬁnity and prevent a
solution being found.
3.6 Parameters and Learning
Banks’ allocation of funds is determined by several endogenous parameters. These are:
reserve ratio (αi), equity ratio (βi), lending interest rate (rloan
i ), deposits interest rate
(r
deposit
i ) and their estimate of being repaid in the inter-bank market (θinterbank
i ). There
is no closed form solution for assigning optimal values to these parameters within this
model with time varying heterogenous banks and under diﬀerent regulatory frameworks.
Instead the values of these parameters are optimized by a genetic algorithm11.
Here we optimize the parameters such that the proﬁtability of banks in maximized,
10Alternative mechanisms including having uneven redistribution and time varying distributions were
tested but had little eﬀect on the results.
11See Arifovic (1996) and Noe et al. (2003) for examples of GA’s used in economics.
12i.e. we ﬁnd those parameters which lead to higher equity. The genetic algorithm functions
as follows. Each parameter for each bank is initially randomly drawn from U(0,1). Each
time period two banks from the population (including those which are bankrupt) are
selected at random with probability proportionate to 1 + Ei. The parameters of the
bank with lower equity are replaced by the values of those of the richer bank subject to
a small perturbation drawn from U(−0.01,0.01). If the poorer bank is bankrupt it is
reintroduced to its previous location on the unit circle with E = 1, R = 1 and no other
assets or liabilities. As such this process also replaces failed banks. This process ensures
the parameter space is explored whilst the population of banks converges to an optimal
parameter set.
4 Results
In order to evaluate the behavior of the model in response to shocks it is necessary to ﬁrst
consider the steady state. All experiments in this paper use the parameters presented in
Table 1 unless otherwise stated. An analysis of robustness to parameters and assumptions
is provided in Section 6.
The ﬁrst two parameter values are chosen based on real world equivalents. US bank-
ing regulation deﬁnes a minimum reserve requirement of 10% and a minimum capital
requirement for a bank to be adequately capitalized of 8%. In making this calculation we
count both inter-bank and ﬁrm loans as having a risk weighting of 1 whilst reserves are
risk-less.
At the start of the simulation Ei = 1, Ri = 1 for all banks whilst all other assets and
liabilities are set to zero. The model was run with 500 diﬀerent random seeds for each of
11 diﬀerent values of λ. Each simulation was run for 10000 time steps. To test convergence
the average values of market parameters during periods 8000−8999 and 9000−9999 were
calculated and a T-Test performed to ensure the parameters were stable. At this point
market statistics were recorded.
134.1 Steady state analysis
In this section we present statistics describing the state of the converged simulations. In
order to support the conclusions of the model we show that key ratios and quantities
are of same magnitudes as those observed empirically. We do not match exactly the
balance sheets of a particular country. To do so precisely would require a considerably
more complex model with many more parameters. In this paper it is suﬃcient that the
magnitudes are correct so that the conclusions drawn from this model hold for a range of
ﬁnancial systems. At the same time a simpler model allows the mechanisms driving the
results to be more clearly identiﬁed.
Table 2 shows the average asset and liability holdings of all banks within the model
economy, together with the balance sheets of all American commercial banks in 2006.
Here pre-ﬁnancial crisis data were chosen to compare to pre-shock model data. Model
balance sheet terms are matched to their closest equivalents. Some terms on the real
balance which have no model equivalents are omitted. In this, and all subsequent tables,
inter-bank loans are the total funds lent within the system, the sum of positive positions.
The sum of all positions within the market would be 0 as inter-bank lending is equal to
inter-bank borrowing within this closed economy12.
Crucially the level of inter-bank lending within the model is close to the value cal-
culated within the real economy. Inter-bank loans are the mechanism by which failures
spread. If the level of loans in the model were of a diﬀerent magnitude to that seen in
reality then bank failures would either spread much more easily or much less frequently
than in reality. Consequently the model would not provide a reasonable estimation of
the role of inter-bank relationships on systemic stability. Importantly the level of cash
reserves in both cases is almost identical, indicating both system have similar amounts of
liquidity available in the event of failures.
The ratio of loans to deposits is very similar in both the model and empirical data.
Relative to equity, however, both of these values are smaller in the model. This is a
12During this period American banks were net borrowers, the ﬁgure for Borrowing (including both
national and international relationships) is therefore a better estimate than that of American Inter-bank
Lending.
14consequence of the inﬂationary process. In order to maintain a ﬁxed level of equity for
computational tractability a relatively high rate of inﬂation (on average 13%) is necessary.
This reduces the value of loans and deposits each time step and is cumulative as loans at
time t are used to calculate deposits at time t + 1. When inﬂation and reserve require-
ments are taken into account the maximum value of loans possible within the model is
approximately 401 which is very close to the observed value.
Bank’s preferred equity and reserve ratios (Table 3) are both less than the values
speciﬁed by the regulations i.e. 8% and 10%. This means that the regulated values
are used in all cases and the banks are maximally leveraged. If the banks adopted this
behavior without the inﬂationary eﬀect, the value of deposits and loans within the model
would be very similar to the empirical data. The banks therefore, behave in a very similar
manner to those in reality. Whilst the absolute value is low the relationship and behaviors
are correct.
The deposit and loan rates within the model of 6.9% and 2.8% (Table 3) are empirically
plausible. The inter-bank rate of 5.8% is high compared to historical values, however, it
is necessary to remember that within this model there is no other source of funds so this
rate rises due to demand for funds to lend to ﬁrms rather than risk.
The model does a good job of matching the magnitudes and key ratios observed
in empirical data. A more complex model with more parameters could do this even
more closely. We emphasize, however, that the purpose of the model is not to exactly
reproduce empirical values from a particular economy. Rather this section shows that the
model replicates the magnitudes and key relationships important in determining systemic
stability. The model, using a relatively simple framework, may therefore be used to
identify relationships and draw conclusions regarding ﬁnancial stability for a range of
ﬁnancial system.
4.2 Market Structure
The structure of the inter-bank market is determined by a combination of the endogenous
bank behavior and exogenous structure. In particular the number of lenders and borrow-
15ers, their size and distribution is determined endogenously by the supply and demand of
funds and loan opportunities. This section will describe and characterize the endogenously
determined features of the inter-bank market and compare them to empirical observations.
Table 3 shows that in line with the empirical results of Iori et al. (2008), for the
Italian inter-bank market, there are more lenders than borrowers and that the majority
of banks act as either sources or sink for loanable funds, relatively few both lend and
borrow. Examination of the average equity of banks within these groups shows agreement
with the ﬁndings of Cocco et al. (2009) and Iori et al. (2008) that large banks are net
borrowers whilst small banks are net lenders and that large lenders have many small
creditors (Muller, 2006). This is because within the model there are only a small number
of large banks, typically around 15%, that are constrained by the amount of funds they
are able to raise through deposits. These banks have high equity and so in order to
be maximally leveraged they must borrow on the inter-bank market. In contrast small
banks do not need to borrow. They are constrained by their level of equity and would
be unable to invest borrowed funds in risky projects. This implies that banks would tend
to lend or borrow from banks of a diﬀerent size to them self who are not constrained in
the same manner. Empirically this is demonstrated by Cocco et al. (2009) who examines
the distribution of loans between banks, ﬁnding that the most common links are between
large and small banks whilst the least common are between pairs of small banks. Table 4
shows a similar relationship in the model when the population is partitioned around the
median wealth.
The endogenous structure of the inter-bank market replicates key structural features
observed in reality. It is important to highlight that these features were not speciﬁed in
the model, rather they were endogenously determined as the optimal behavior of banks
within this ﬁnancial setting. The results suggest that this model may have a strong basis
to provide insight into the behavior of real ﬁnancial systems.
164.3 Individual Bankruptcy
As discussed in the introduction, opinion is divided on the eﬀect of the structure of the
inter-bank market on the probability and severity of contagion. The stabilizing eﬀect and
the contagion spreading eﬀect appear to be in direct contradiction. To examine these
forces we ﬁrst consider the failure of a single bank and its impact on the rest of the
ﬁnancial system. Similar analysis has been conducted in other studies both analytically
and empirically for a range of inter-bank markets with mixed results13. Elsinger et al.
(2006), using Austrian data, show that systemic failures from the collapse of a single bank
only occur in about 1% of cases. Further, only a small proportion of banks are able to
cause systemic crisis (Boss et al., 2004) or are susceptible should a partner institution fail
(Angelini et al., 1996). The eﬀect of contagion when it occurs, however, can be very large
(Gai and Kapadia, 2010). For instance Humphrey (1986) shows that the collapse of a
large American bank could potentially bankrupt 37% of banks in the market.
The converged economies presented in the previous section serve as a basis for this
analysis. The state of the market, the bank positions and inter-bank loans, is recorded
and a single bank made bankrupt by setting its equity and reserves to zero. The eﬀect of
this bankruptcy on the rest of the economy is analyzed before the state of the market is
reset. This is repeated for each bank in turn.
Table 5 shows that as the market becomes more connected the eﬀect of a bankruptcy,
as measured by the average number of subsequent failures, is reduced, in agreement with
the ﬁndings of Allen and Gale (2001), Giesecke and Weber (2006) and Freixas et al. (2000).
This is because fewer banks are able to cause another to fail (decreasing Probability in
Table 5). As Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) argue, whilst more banks may be touched by
contagion, if the market is more heavily connected the probability that any of them will
fail is reduced. The higher level of connectivity provides diversiﬁcation of credit risk for
the banks. When a bank fails the impact is more spread and the eﬀect on each individual
lender is reduced.
The same table also shows that for more connected markets whilst contagious events
13For example: Boss et al. (2004), Upper and Worms (2004), Nier et al. (2007), Gai and Kapadia
(2010) Vivier-Lirimont (2006) and Allen and Gale (2001).
17are rarer when they do occur the number of banks which go bankrupt increases. This
suggest a greater vulnerability, however, this is not the case. The average equity of the
banks which cause contagion increases with connectivity i.e. only the larger banks are able
to cause contagious failures. The impact of smaller banks is suﬃciently well spread that
in many cases they do not cause other banks to fail. The average equity of failing banks
for all market structures in approximately 0.75 which is less than the market average of
one, indicating that smaller banks are more vulnerable to contagious failure.
An alternative measure of a market’s potential susceptibility to contagion is the max-
imum number of bankruptcies a failure may cause. The sizes of the largest failures are
of the same magnitude as those seen in reality. Upper and Worms (2004) ﬁnd within
the German Banking system a single bankruptcy may cause at most 15% of the other
banks to fail whilst Humphrey (1986) shows that the collapse of a major US bank could
lead to 37% of banks defaulting. The relationship with connectivity diﬀers from that of
average contagion. Here the most vulnerable markets are those with an intermediate level
of connectivity (λ = 0.4). Whilst not, on average, the most susceptible to contagion these
markets are particularly vulnerable to the failure of crucial banks. Banks within these
markets are suﬃciently poorly connected that if one fails, the shock is strong enough to
drive other banks to failure. At the same time the market is suﬃciently well connected
that a single bankruptcy could potentially aﬀect many other banks. The combination
of large shocks and wide spread make these markets particularly vulnerable if the wrong
large bank fails.
4.4 Systemic Shocks
The results presented in the previous section are important in understanding the vulner-
ability of the ﬁnancial system to a single failure. In reality, however, the failure of a bank
is often not an isolated event. Instead a failure may be caused by a shock which aﬀects
the whole ﬁnancial system. Macroeconomic events may aﬀect multiple institutions simul-
taneously, weakening balance sheets and potentially causing several unconnected banks
to fail at the same time (Gorton, 1988). This section will consider the eﬀect of such a
18shock.
Few studies have examined the eﬀect of the inter-bank market during a systemic shock.
It is not clear whether contagion in the inter-bank market will be signiﬁcant or if it will
be secondary to the ﬁnancial shock itself (e.g. Giesecke and Weber, 2006). At the same
time it is unclear how the risk-bearing and contagion spreading eﬀects interact as equity is
eroded. A market in which each bank is connected to a greater number of counter-parties
may allow system liquidity to be better utilized reducing the impact. Alternatively, as the
market becomes more connected the weakest banks may be more likely to be eﬀected and
fail. One of the few papers to comment on this issue is Lorenz and Battiston (2008), they
ﬁnd that increasing inter-bank connectivity at ﬁrst reduces the incidence of bankruptcy
but for more connected markets it increases. Battiston et al. (2009), whilst not explicitly
modeling a systemic shock, ﬁnd a similar pattern when they permit multiple bankruptcies
to occur in the same period.
In this section we examine the eﬀect of systemic shocks on the model economy. Each
converged market suﬀers a macro-economic shock during the ﬁrst time step after the
converged state. This shock is implemented by changing the probability of project success
for projects which ﬁnish in the shock time step from θ
t−2
i to θshock. All projects ending in
other time periods are left unchanged. We perform the experiment for a range of values
of θshock showing how diﬀerent macroeconomic shock severities eﬀect the stability of the
ﬁnancial system.
Figure 1 presents results showing the average number of bankruptcies across diﬀerent
market architectures and for diﬀerent shock severity’s. As θshock decreases fewer projects
are completed successfully, leading to higher losses for banks and more failures. Market
connectivity has a non-linear eﬀect on this relationship. For small shocks a more highly
connected market reduces bankruptcies, limiting the spread of contagion by spreading the
impact of failures. In contrast for larger shocks the pattern is reversed, more sparsely con-
nected markets are less susceptible to contagion. For intermediate shock sizes, moderately
connected markets may be the most vulnerable, for example θshock = 0.775.
The severity of contagion is highly dependent on the degree to which failures spread.
19As connectivity increases each bankruptcy aﬀects more counter-parties. At the same
time a lender splits the same amount of funds between more banks meaning loans are
smaller and so the probability that the non-repayment of an inter-bank loan causes the
lender to go bankrupt is reduced, i.e. they diversify some of the credit risk. A systemic
shock reduces the equity of all banks. For small shocks equity is only slightly damaged.
In highly connected markets if a bank fails the impact is suﬃciently well spread that
the bankruptcy rarely cause a counter-party to fail as a result. The diversifying eﬀect
of increased inter-bank connectivity reduces risk. As connectivity decreases the average
loan size to counter-parties increases and failures becomes more likely. Larger systemic
shocks result in much reduced bank equities and so smaller counter-party losses may
cause bankruptcy. Consequently banks in more connected markets start to be at risk
from the failure of their counter-parties. For the largest systemic shocks bank equities
are damaged to such an extent that regardless of connectivity the failure of any counter-
party is suﬃcient to cause a lender to fail. Instead of spreading the impact the higher
connectivity results in more banks being aﬀected and failing. At the same time the
diversiﬁcation eﬀect from many inter-bank connections is weakened as the failure of banks
becomes increasingly correlated. In less well-connected markets banks fail but the scope
of contagion is reduced as each bank failure eﬀects a smaller subset of the population.
For θshock = 0.775 the point at which the liklihood of a bank failing and spreading a
shock is maximized at intermediate levels of connectivity. At this level of shock, more
connected markets spread impacts suﬃciently well that relatively few banks fail whilst
less connected markets spread the shock to too few partners, limiting the spread.
The results support a range of empirical and analytical ﬁndings which previously ap-
peared contradictory. They agree with Giesecke and Weber (2006) that for small shocks,
connections reduce contagion whilst they also support the ﬁnding of Vivier-Lirimont
(2006) that more connected markets result in more banks in the contagion process. Sim-
ilarly they support the results of Georg (2011) and Iori et al. (2006) that contagion may
be more signiﬁcant when the market is more connected. Whilst the results for the largest
shocks agree with Allen and Gale (2001), the inter-bank market is of little use when there
20is a system wide shortage of liquidity.
The pattern of failures shown in this paper diﬀers from that of Lorenz and Battiston
(2008) and Battiston et al. (2009). Both of these papers ﬁnd that failures are minimized
for intermediate levels of market connectivity. In each case the authors examine diﬀerent
mechanisms to those employed here. The model of Lorenz and Battiston (2008) diﬀers
in that it does not permit cascades, a mechanism central to our ﬁndings. The results of
Battiston et al. (2009), in contrast, are driven by an inter-temporal ﬁnancial accelerator.
This mechanism does not have an equivalent within our model as we focus on the short
term (within period) eﬀects. If this mechanism is removed, the authors ﬁnd a similar
pattern of results to that seen in this paper for smaller shocks i.e. increasing connectivity
reducing contagion.
To examine the importance of contagion we separate the failures in the banking system
into two groups (Figure 1) in a similar manner to Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2010); the
casualties of the initial shock and those caused by the failure of counter-parties. In line
with Elsinger et al. (2006), for all but the smallest shock in the most connected markets
over half of the bankruptcies are caused by contagion. The systemic shock plays a major
role in weakening the banks’ equity, however, it is the failure of counter-parties which
induces bankruptcy in the majority of cases and so is a signiﬁcant aspect of systemic risk.
The number and size of banks which fail in the face of a systemic crisis is only one
measure of the severity of the impact. If a bank fails the deposit insurer has to step in to
compensate depositors. The insurer may therefore be concerned with the cost of repaying
deposits rather than the number of bank failures in judging the optimal inter-bank market
structure and whether rescuing banks would be appropriate. Figure 2 shows that as the
size of the shock increases the cost to the depositor insurer also increase. The market
architecture, however, has a very diﬀerent eﬀect on the cost of failures from that observed
for the number of bankruptcies. As connectivity decreases the cost to the insurer increase
regardless of the size of shock. This is because the more connected a market is the more
of the cost of failures are born by the surviving banks. When a bank fails in a weakly
connected market it has a large impact on a relatively small number of creditors. The
21impact heavily damages their balance sheets resulting in a large loss in equity and little
left to pay depositors. In contrast, in a strongly connected market the failure of each
bank aﬀects many more counter-parties. This may result in more bankruptcies, however,
the smaller impacts mean that those banks which fail may still have some assets on their
balance sheet and be able to partially repay depositors. The surviving aﬀected banks
eﬀectively bear some of the cost of the failure in terms of reduced equity. For the insurer
increased connectivity is beneﬁcial as it reduces costs, even if it potentially increases the
number of bank failures14.
5 Regulation
The previous section highlighted the eﬀects of the market structure on contagion under
both individual and systemic shocks. Here we consider mechanisms for limiting the impact
of these events and their wider eﬀect on the market.
5.1 Equity and Reserve ratio
A key proposal put forward in the Basel III reforms requires banks to hold a higher
percentage of capital relative to their risky assets. As a result, banks are more tightly
constrained in the degree to which they can leverage their positions and so should be less at
risk of failure through poor investment outcomes. An alternative proposal has been made
to tighten banks minimum reserve ratios. This change would force banks to hold a higher
proportion of liquid reserves which would provide them with increased protection against
liquidity shocks. Both of these mechanism are tested within this model. The equity and
reserve ratios are varied independently and 500 further experiments conducted for each
parameter combination. We consider increases of each requirement to 12% and 15% for
the equity and reserve ratios respectively. We focus our analysis on the case of systemic
shocks as the eﬀect of these regulatory changes on individual bank failures has already
received much attention. Nier et al. (2007), Iori et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010)
14There may be additional social costs due to damage to the payment system if many banks fail.
22all ﬁnd that increasing the amount of reserves which banks hold reduces the number of
bankruptcies.
Figure 3 shows that increasing the equity ratio results in a large reduction in failures in
nearly all cases. The decreased level of leverage reduces the impact of the macro-economic
shock. At the same time there is a reduction in inter-bank lending which limits the eﬀect
of failing banks on their counter-parties. Together these two factors combine to reduce
the total impact of a shock. Increasing the reserve ratio has a relatively small eﬀect on
the markets susceptibility to contagion which is generally only signiﬁcant for very large
shocks. This is because contagion is primarily driven by banks failing through lack of
equity. The increased reserve ratio means banks hold more liquid funds which may allow
a bank to repay a loan when one of its own loans is not repaid. In the model market, as
in real markets, there are relatively few banks which both lend and borrow (Iori et al.,
2008) so increasing liquidity has a limited eﬀect. Whilst both of the regulations reduce
the number of bankruptcies the mechanism by which they do so, restricted lending to
ﬁrms and banks, has a negative eﬀect on the economy as a whole. The average value of
loans to ﬁrms reduces by 8% to 361.3 for the change in reserve ratio and 12% to 345.1
for the change in equity ratio. The overall eﬀect of these regulatory changes is therefore
ambiguous, they reduce bankruptcies but at the same time reduce lending.
5.2 Borrowing Constraints
An alternative to constraining the total lending or borrowing is instead to constrain the
maximum funds a bank may lend to a single counter-party. This forces banks to diversify
their inter-bank lending, making them less susceptible to the failure of a single debtor.
Here we implement this regulation by limiting the maximum a particular lender may lend
to a particular borrower to be no more than a multiple η of the borrowers equity.
Table 6 presents the results of 500 simulation for three diﬀerent borrowing constraints.
For η = 10 it can be seen that the constraint does not eﬀect the steady state results, there
is no signiﬁcant change in any of the market statistics. As η is decreased the constraint
becomes binding. For η = 5 the eﬀect of the regulation is beneﬁcial, the number of
23systemic bankruptcies is signiﬁcantly reduced. The regulatory change limits the size of
the inter-bank connections reducing the probability of a bank failing due to the collapse
of one of its creditors. The regulatory change also has a broader beneﬁcial eﬀect. There
is a reduction in the demand for inter-bank loans which, reduces the total volume of loans
and the interest rate in the market. As a result the volume of loans to ﬁrms increases and
there is more competition between banks forcing down the ﬁrm borrowing rate.
If the borrowing constraints are too tight, however, there can be substantial negative
eﬀects. For η = 2 there is still a signiﬁcant reduction in bankruptcies. The function of the
inter-bank market, however, is severely impaired, meaning funds are no longer eﬃciently
allocated and the total value of loans to ﬁrms is heavily reduced. By regulating too heavily
the economy is severely restricted.
6 Model Sensitivity
The model presented above provides a framework which captures the key behaviors of
banks, ﬁrms and households. Assumptions were made in forming the model, which whilst
making it more transparent, simpliﬁed important aspects of real world behavior. Here
we relax several of these assumptions to move the model closer to reality whilst also
permitting a greater degree of heterogeneity within the system.
6.1 Parameter sensitivity
The results presented above are based on one parameter combination. Here we demon-
strate the robustness of the results and how behavior changes if parameters are varied.
Table 1 details the models six key parameters. Of these six, changes to αg and βg have
already been considered as regulatory actions. Further simulations were run in which the
remaining four parameter values were changed and the key aﬀects reported15.
Varying the payoﬀ from investments, µ, aﬀects the loan, deposit and inter-bank interest
rates. Greater returns from investments allow banks to charge ﬁrms higher interest rates
15Tables of results demonstrating the relations are available from the author upon request.
24which in turn allows banks to pay higher rates for funds from both depositors and on the
inter-bank market. The model is robust to a wide range of values. µ = 1.15 was chosen
as it produced deposit and loans rates comparable to reality.
The parameters controlling the probability of a successful investment, θ, and the
number of ﬁrms, Q, are closely linked. Together they control the supply of potentially
fundable loan requests. A decrease in ﬁrms results in fewer loan requests per time-period,
whilst a decrease in θ reduces the expected return of projects making fewer proﬁtably
fundable16. The results of the model are robust across a wide range of parameter values
(0.9 < θ < 0.999, Q > 20N), if either or both values are too low there may be insuﬃcient
proﬁtable investment proposals resulting in unallocated funds and potentially no inter-
bank lending. Q = 10000 and θ = 0.99 provided suﬃcient supply of funding requests
whilst maintaining computational tractability. Increasing Q beyond this point leads to
signiﬁcantly slower program execution without changing the results.
While θ and Q describe the supply of investment projects, N, the number of banks,
controls the demand. The model produces qualitatively similar results for a wide range
of values (N > 40). N = 100 was chosen as it is of the same magnitude as the number
of banks in many of the worlds inter-bank markets, though some are much larger or
smaller. M the number of households has very little eﬀect on the behavior of the model
as households simply pay deposits into the banks. The number of households was set
equal to the number of ﬁrms, however, for numbers of households 500 < M < 1000000
there was little quantitative eﬀect.
6.2 Bank conﬁdence
One of the key features of the recent ﬁnancial crisis was the loss of liquidity within inter-
bank markets. Banks observed the failures of other ﬁnancial institutions and became
reluctant to lend due to the fear of not regaining their funds. The loss of conﬁdence
resulted in a shortage of liquidity and an exacerbation of the crisis. In the model presented
above the failure of a bank may cause other banks to fail. Banks, however, do not take
16Note this parameter also interacts with µ. The larger the value of µ the lower θ may be whilst
maintaining a proﬁtable project.
25this into account, they do not become more reluctant to lend even though the probability
of funds not being returned is potentially increased. To capture this eﬀect the model is













Where Bt is the number of bank failures in the current time step t and κi is a parameter
controlling the size of bank i’s reaction to bankruptcies. A larger value of κi means that
bank i reacts more strongly to a bankruptcy with a greater loss of conﬁdence in the
inter-bank market and so a greater reduction in the banks estimate of the liklihood of
being repaid. The value of κi is assigned randomly at the start of the simulation and is
optimized in the same way as deposit and loan interest rates. Bt is set each time period
based on the number of bank failures.
Allowing banks to react to failures negatively aﬀects the eﬃciency of the economy.
There are fewer loans to ﬁrms and fewer inter-bank loans, both quantities also have a
higher standard deviation (Table 7). This reduction in lending, however, does reduce the
number of bankruptcies in systemic shocks. Less inter-bank lending means fewer banks
fail due to contagion. Unfortunately this reduction is accompanied by a much larger fall
in the amount of loans to ﬁrms. Banks react to the failure of counter-parties by stopping
lending on the inter-bank market. As a consequence funds are less eﬃciently allocated
and the economy as a whole suﬀers.
6.3 Credit Worthiness
In the base model it was assumed that there existed a single inter-bank interest rate. It
was argued that this was a reasonable assumption if banks have limited information about
each others states, the probability of systemic events is low, and the market is eﬃcient.
In a crisis, however, banks vary their inter-bank rates depending on the counter-party.
More credit worthy banks, those thought less likely to fail, pay lower rates. At the same
time banks tend to interact repeatedly with the same counter-parties (Cocco et al., 2009)
26potentially allowing more attractive interest rates due to improved information.
Each time period each bank has associated with it a risk premia, ζi drawn from
|N(0,1/Ei)| which is the market estimation of the necessary compensation to lenders for
the risk of it failing. This is a simpliﬁcation of a potentially very complex eﬀect. In reality
a banks risk premia is dependent on its own situation and the risk attitudes of all other
market participants. This mechanism, however, matches the empirical ﬁndings of Akram
and Christophersen (2010) that larger banks receive more favorable inter-bank interest
rates. I also agrees with our earlier observation that larger banks are less likely to fail
(e.g. Section 4.3). This rate is added to the inter-bank rate bank i pays when it borrows.
When a bank lends money it calculates its lending preferences using the base inter-bank
rate. The recipients premia is not included as the additional value received over the base
inter-bank rate is considered to be fair compensation for the additional risk. As such the
bank does not have a preference between potential borrowers.
The addition of a risk premia reduces inter-bank lending and increases stability. As
a result the market is less volatile, there are fewer bankruptcies and more funds are
allocated to ﬁrms (Table 7). The system as a whole is more resilient, in response to
systemic shocks, the number of failures is reduced whilst the amount of lending to ﬁrms
is less eﬀected. This agrees with Park (1991), who shows that historically the availability
of solvency information regarding individual banks reduces the severity of panics. Here
the risk premia is conditional on bank equity and so is equivalent to giving banks this
information. The introduction of the risk premia makes it relatively more expensive for
smaller and potentially more vulnerable banks to borrow. As a consequence inter-bank
borrowing along with the potential for systemic risk are both reduced. This occurs in a
consistent and stable manner, as opposed to the eﬀects of bank conﬁdence set out above,
resulting in the increased stability and lending to ﬁrms.
7 Conclusion
The structure of the inter-bank lending market has a major eﬀect on the stability of
the ﬁnancial system. Previous work has shown two contradictory relationships, both an
27increasing and decreasing liklihood of failures with increasing market connectivity. The
model presented here demonstrates the conditions under which each eﬀect is dominant.
For systemic shocks the optimal inter-bank market connectivity varies with shock size.
Under small shocks higher connectivity helps to resist contagion but for larger shocks it
has the opposite eﬀect. As a consequence there is no single best market architecture able
to limit contagion from systemic shocks. There is, however, an optimal market structure
for reducing the costs of these shocks. The more connected a market is, the more the costs
of failures are internalized reducing the cost to an insurer. In response to an individual
bankruptcy more inter-bank connections reduce the expected number of failures. Despite
this relationship it is found that intermediately connected markets potentially suﬀer the
largest contagious eﬀects. These markets share risk less well than those better connected
yet are potentially susceptible to the failure of a single bank spreading and aﬀecting the
whole market making them particularly vulnerable to the failure of the largest banks.
In order to limit the eﬀects of contagion several regulatory actions were examined.
Changes to both the reserve and equity ratios were considered but were found to have
ambiguous results. In both cases increasing the ratios resulted in a decreased size of
contagion but also decreased lending, though both eﬀects are more marked for changes in
the equity ratio. Loan constraints that limit the amount a lender may lend to a particular
borrower, were also considered. For intermediate levels of regulation bankruptcies were
reduced and more loans given to ﬁrms, suggesting this could be a promising mechanism
for limiting systemic risk. It was also shown that if banks react to the bankruptcies of
their peers the economy is destabilized and funds are allocated less eﬃciently. In contrast
if banks condition their lending rates on the credit worthiness of their counter-parties this
reduces risk and makes the market less susceptible to contagion.
The model is suﬃciently general that it invites further extension. The architecture
of the market considered in this paper was imposed exogenously, banks had no choice
about their counter-parties. A richer model would relax this constraint, allowing lenders
to select and decline potential borrowers and to oﬀer diﬀerent interest rates based on the
counter-parties ﬁnancial position. This would allow issues such as the characterization
28of the optimal market structure to be addressed. Even without making this endogenous
there are other market structures which could be investigated, for instance hierarchical
networks as seen in the UK inter-bank market or scale-free topologies.
The regulatory changes considered in this paper were of a static nature, regulations
were changed and the model simulated to ﬁnd the new equilibrium. This does not have
to be the case. There is scope to investigate the application of regulations dynamically,
for instance changing capital or reserve requirement or providing banks with additional
liquidity at particular points in time. The role of the central bank was also not considered.
Allen et al. (2009) have shown how a central bank may limit volatility through open
market operations whilst Georg (2011) examines the ability of a central bank to stabilize
a ﬁnancial network. Central bank intervention, in the form of bail outs or quantitative
easing could also be examined with this model.
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Figure 1: Total number of bankruptcies occurring on shock period (solid line) and the number
of bankruptcies which were caused by contagion (dashed line), for diﬀerent values of θshock and
λ. Note the scale on the Y axis changes to illustrate the eﬀect of λ. All shocks conducted at
period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions.

















Figure 2: Total cost of repaying depositors of failed banks for diﬀerent values of θshock and λ.
The top line corresponds to the largest shock (θshock = 0.6) the lines below are for shocks of






































































































































Figure 3: Total number of bankruptcies occurring on shock period for the base model (solid
line), increased equity ratio (dashed line) and increased reserve ratio (dotted line), for diﬀerent
values of θshock and λ. Note the changing scale on the Y axis to illustrate changes with λ. All
shocks conducted at period 10000 and averaged over 500 repetitions in each case.
36Parameter Meaning Value
αg Reserve Requirement 0.10





j Project success probability U(0.99,1.0)
µ Project payoﬀ 1.15
Table 1: Parameters used for all simulations (unless otherwise stated).
37Model Type Value SD Empirical Type Normalized Real
Loans 391.5 (32.6) Loans 986.7 8281.9
Inter-bank Loans 283.3 (36.9) Inter-bank Borrowing 233.4 1958.8
Reserves 34.8 (3.4) Cash Assets 35.9 301.0
Unused capital 14.3 (6.8)
Deposits 341.3 (31.1) Deposits 751.0 6303.2
Equity 99.1 (5.1) Residual 99.1 831.8
Table 2: Assets and liabilities of model data along with data for commercial banks in the USA
(billions of Dollars), December 2006, source: H.8 statement, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. The left hand side of the table presents the model data whilst the right hand
side presents empirical data normalized such that the Residual is equal to the model Equity.
Unused capital is capital placed in reserves above that which the banks reserve ratio speciﬁes due
to the bank being unable to ﬁnd a proﬁtable way to allocate the funds. The level of inter-bank
lending in the model is the sum of all positive positions. By deﬁnition the sum of all positions,
positive and negative is 0. Items in the H.8 statement with no equivalent in the model are
omitted
38Term Value SD Term Value SD
Loan Rate 0.069 (0.011) Inter-bank Rate 0.058 (0.01)
Deposit Rate 0.028 (0.006) Inﬂation Rate 0.13 (0.02)
Lenders 77.6 (6.1) Average Lender Equity 0.83 (0.08)
Borrowers 21.1 (4.9) Average Borrower Equity 1.67 (0.61)
Both 4.57 (2.79) Average Both Equity 0.87 (0.29)
Bankrupt 0.18 (0.81) αi 0.06 (0.03)
θinterbank
i 0.99 (0.05) βi 0.06 (0.04)
Table 3: Aggregate model statistics at period 10000 averaged over 500 runs. Standard deviations
in parenthesis. Values calculated prior to inﬂation/consumption eﬀect. ‘Both’ in the table refers
to those banks in the system who were lenders in one period and borrowers in the next (or vise
versa).
39λ Connections Large to Large Large to Small Small to Small
0.0 180.0 (26.7) 65.4 (9.4) 97.5 (21.2) 17.1 (13.2)
0.1 386.5 (55.0) 123.3 (13.8) 210.4 (44.6) 52.7 (29.1)
0.2 684.2 (109.4) 207.2 (26.2) 364.3 (89.3) 112.7 (57.6)
0.3 1017.7 (154.2) 307.8 (39.6) 537.2 (124.8) 172.7 (81.5)
0.4 1307.4 (204.0) 408.9 (56.8) 694.5 (165.7) 204.0 (104.6)
0.5 1643.0 (253.3) 517.4 (69.9) 875.5 (205.6) 250.1 (130.5)
0.6 1965.0 (298.9) 627.4 (83.1) 1054.7 (244.0) 282.9 (151.3)
0.7 2298.5 (339.4) 727.2 (95.1) 1227.1 (272.5) 344.2 (178.5)
0.8 2598.6 (394.2) 829.6 (111.2) 1391.5 (314.7) 377.4 (209.7)
0.9 2984.0 (440.6) 942.2 (123.0) 1597.3 (359.6) 444.6 (222.9)
1.0 3298.9 (494.8) 1049.1 (137.4) 1778.5 (403.6) 471.2 (251.2)
Table 4: Statistics describing the structure of the inter-bank market network for variation in λ.
Statistics collected at day 10000 and averaged over 500 runs. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
The last three columns give the number of lending relationships between large banks (above
median size) and small banks (below median size).
40λ Failures Probability Size Cause Equity Largest
0.0 1.62 (0.61) 0.226 (0.059) 7.16 (3.98) 2.08 (3.20) 19.8 (10.5)
0.1 1.59 (0.45) 0.213 (0.049) 7.45 (2.87) 1.84 (1.15) 24.6 (11.7)
0.2 1.43 (0.47) 0.183 (0.036) 7.82 (3.30) 1.92 (0.83) 28.9 (13.1)
0.3 1.17 (0.52) 0.144 (0.029) 8.10 (3.90) 2.15 (0.90) 28.8 (14.3)
0.4 0.96 (0.60) 0.105 (0.029) 9.15 (4.88) 2.52 (1.05) 29.8 (16.5)
0.5 0.71 (0.75) 0.074 (0.030) 9.58 (6.06) 2.81 (1.06) 27.5 (18.1)
0.6 0.57 (0.93) 0.052 (0.029) 10.89 (8.06) 3.15 (1.31) 27.2 (20.3)
0.7 0.43 (1.18) 0.036 (0.026) 11.75 (10.90) 3.28 (1.74) 25.8 (23.3)
0.8 0.35 (1.42) 0.026 (0.024) 13.46 (14.56) 3.34 (2.29) 26.0 (26.5)
0.9 0.26 (1.77) 0.018 (0.022) 13.93 (18.42) 3.24 (2.94) 23.4 (28.7)
1.0 0.22 (2.10) 0.013 (0.019) 16.79 (25.70) 3.13 (3.51) 23.1 (32.4)
Table 5: Statistics showing the eﬀects of single bankruptcies on the economy for variation in
λ. ‘Failures’ is the average number of banks which fail as a consequence of a single bank being
made bankrupt (excluding the initial bank). ‘Probability’ is the chance that contagion will occur.
‘Size’ is the average number of banks which go bankrupt conditional on contagion occurring.
‘Cause Equity’ is the average equity of the banks which cause contagion. ‘Largest’ is the size of
the largest contagion. Data collected using market states saved at period 10000 and averaged
over 500 runs.
41η
Shock Size ∞ 10 5 2
0.6 82.9 (12.17) 82.5 (12.49) 66.1 (15.48)** 37.1 (13.51)**
0.7 69.9 (18.03) 69.7 (18.12) 50.5 (17.39)** 26.3 (10.57)**
0.8 40.6 (22.43) 40.6 (22.40) 26.1 (15.95)** 17.4 (8.10)**
0.9 8.4 (9.37) 8.4 (9.35) 7.8 (5.41)** 9.4 (4.55)**
Loans 391.5 (32.62) 392.9 (35.44) 404.0 (75.58)** 303.3 (86.72)**
I-bank Loans 283.3 (36.91) 282.2 (39.98) 189.3 (63.64)** 66.1 (27.25)**
Lending Rate 0.069 (0.008) 0.068 (0.006) 0.050 (0.008)** 0.025 (0.001)**
I-bank Rate 0.058 (0.010) 0.058 (0.013) 0.045 (0.018)** 0.016 (0.011)**
Table 6: Statistics showing the eﬀects of systemic shocks on the economy for diﬀerent borrowing
constraints averaged across λ. All shocks conducted at period 10000 and averaged over 500
repetitions in each case. η = ∞ corresponds to the base case where there is no constraint.
The market statistics at the bottom are pre-crash values. 1% signiﬁcance indicated by **, 5%
signiﬁcance by *.
42Inter-bank Conﬁdence Credit Worthiness
Bankrupt Loans I-B Loans Bankrupt Loans I-B Loans
Steady 0.26 341.0 246.6 0.04 410.7 247.7
state (1.11) (89.2)** (80.4)** (0.26)** (20.3)** (28.8)**
0.6 66.37 58.4 16.5 79.65 84.8 14.9
(30.80)** (87.7) (55.8) (8.99)** (81.9)** (27.4)
0.7 56.79 83.9 25.9 64.74 141.1 40.7
(30.10)** (102.0)** (61.6)* (15.86)** (112.0)** (64.9)
0.8 35.46 126.8 53.7 33.71 227.8 109.4
(26.00)** (109.5)** (75.6)** (19.32)** (91.9)** (80.9)*
0.9 7.57 199.2 113.9 6.56 347.4 205.0
(10.00) (93.9)** (77.6)** (6.27)** (37.7)** (35.6)**
Table 7: Statistics showing the steady state and eﬀect of systemic shocks for two diﬀerent model
cases. Values averaged over λ, collected at period 10000 for 500 repetitions in each case. 1%
signiﬁcance indicated by **, 5% signiﬁcance by *.
43